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       PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
Nos. 14-1941, 14-3495 
________________ 
 
JOHN DOE, by and through Jack Doe and Jane Doe; 
JACK DOE, individually and on behalf of his son, John Doe; 
JANE DOE, individually and on behalf of her son, John Doe, 
    Appellants 
v. 
 
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 
 
GARDEN STATE EQUALITY, 
                               Intervenor-Defendant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-13-cv-06629) 
 
District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 19, 2015 
 
Before:  SMITH, VANASKIE, SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: April 13, 2015) 
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________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
________ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, 767 
F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), this court rejected a challenge 
brought by licensed counselors in the State of New Jersey to 
the constitutionality of Assembly Bill A3371 (“A3371”), a 
New Jersey statute banning the provision of “sexual 
orientation change efforts” (“SOCE”) counseling to minors.  
A similar challenge to the constitutionality of the same statute 
is before us again, this time by a minor seeking to undergo 
SOCE counseling and by his parents.  As in King, and for the 
reasons that follow, we reject the present challenge and will 
affirm the decision of the District Court dismissing 
Appellants’ complaint.1 
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction 
over the final order of the District Court dated July 31, 2014 
dismissing Appellants’ complaint.  As we recently reaffirmed, 
“[w]e review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).”  Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 
754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014).  We must “accept as 
true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them 
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I. 
 
 We assume the familiarity of the parties with A3371 
and our opinion in King.2   In brief, A3371 provides:  
                                                                                                     
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 
 Appellants also filed a separate notice of appeal with 
respect to the District Court’s March 28, 2014 letter order, 
which stayed the matter and administratively terminated 
Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction.  The impetus 
behind the March 28, 2014 letter order was a pending petition 
for a writ of certiorari seeking Supreme Court review of 
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 2871 (2014), a Ninth Circuit decision addressing issues 
similar to those raised in the instant case.  Appellees contend 
that the District Court’s July 31, 2014 final order dismissing 
the complaint renders the March 28, 2014 letter order moot.  
We agree.  See Hankins v. Temple Univ., 829 F.2d 437, 438 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Dr. Hankins’ interlocutory appeal from 
the denial of her motion for a preliminary injunction was 
rendered moot by the issuance of the district court’s final 
order on the merits. Therefore, . . . we need not address the 
propriety of the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion 
for preliminary injunctive relief.”).  In light of our affirmance 
of the final order of the District Court, we decline to address 
the appeal from the March 28, 2014 letter order, and we will 
dismiss that appeal as moot. 
 
 2 A3371 is now codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 45:1-54, 
55.  We continue to refer to the law as A3371 to be consistent 
with the nomenclature used in the parties’ briefs and in King. 
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a. A person who is licensed to provide 
professional counseling . . . shall not 
engage in sexual orientation change 
efforts with a person under 18 years of 
age. 
 
b. As used in this section, “sexual 
orientation change efforts” means the 
practice of seeking to change a 
person’s sexual orientation, including, 
but not limited to, efforts to change 
behaviors, gender identity, or gender 
expressions, or to reduce or eliminate 
sexual or romantic attractions or 
feelings toward a person of the same 
gender; except that sexual orientation 
change efforts shall not include 
counseling for a person seeking to 
transition from one gender to another, 
or counseling that: 
 
(1) provides acceptance, support, and 
understanding of a person or facilitates 
a person’s coping, social support, and 
identity exploration and development, 
including sexual orientation-neutral 
interventions to prevent or address 
unlawful conduct or unsafe sexual 
practices; and 
 
(2) does not seek to change sexual 
orientation. 
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N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:1-55.  The New Jersey Legislature (“the 
Legislature”) provided legislative findings regarding the 
potential for harm from SOCE counseling and the lack of 
evidence that such counseling is effective.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 45:1-54.  For example, the Legislature found that: 
 
The American Psychological 
Association convened a Task Force on 
Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to 
Sexual Orientation. The task force 
conducted a systematic review of peer-
reviewed journal literature on sexual 
orientation change efforts, and issued a 
report in 2009. The task force concluded 
that sexual orientation change efforts 
can pose critical health risks to lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual people, including 
confusion, depression, guilt, 
helplessness, hopelessness, shame, 
social withdrawal, suicidality, substance 
abuse, stress, disappointment, self-
blame, decreased self-esteem and 
authenticity to others, increased self-
hatred, hostility and blame toward 
parents, feelings of anger and betrayal, 
loss of friends and potential romantic 
partners, problems in sexual and 
emotional intimacy, sexual dysfunction, 
high-risk sexual behaviors, a feeling of 
being dehumanized and untrue to self, a 
loss of faith, and a sense of having 
wasted time and resources[.] 
 . . .  
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The American Academy of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry in 2012 published 
an article in its journal, Journal of the 
American Academy of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry, stating: 
“Clinicians should be aware that there is 
no evidence that sexual orientation can 
be altered through therapy, and that 
attempts to do so may be harmful. There 
is no empirical evidence adult 
homosexuality can be prevented if 
gender nonconforming children are 
influenced to be more gender 
conforming. Indeed, there is no 
medically valid basis for attempting to 
prevent homosexuality, which is not an 
illness.”  
 
Id.  The Legislature stated that “New Jersey has a compelling 
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors . . . and in protecting its minors against 
exposure to serious harms caused by [SOCE].”  Id. 
 
 In King, the plaintiff counselors challenged A3371 as 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment as an 
abridgement of their rights to free speech and the free 
exercise of religion.  767 F.3d at 222.  As to the free speech 
claim, we first determined “that speech occurring as part of 
SOCE counseling is professional speech,” and restrictions on 
professional speech, like those on commercial speech, are 
given intermediate scrutiny.  Id. at 233-34.  Thus, A3371 was 
“permissible only if it directly advances the State’s 
substantial interest in protecting clients from ineffective or 
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harmful professional services, and is not more extensive than 
necessary to serve that interest.”  Id. at 235 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  We rejected the plaintiff 
counselors’ arguments that A3371 constituted content or 
viewpoint discrimination and was, as a result, subject to strict 
scrutiny.  Id. at 236-37. 
 
 We then determined that A3371 survived intermediate 
scrutiny and was “a permissible prohibition of professional 
speech.”  Id. at 240.  This was based on our finding that the 
State has an “unquestionably substantial” interest in 
protecting citizens from harmful professional practices, and 
that this interest is even stronger where the citizens protected 
are minors, “a population that is especially vulnerable to such 
practices.”  Id. at 237-38.  We found that the State met its 
burden of demonstrating that SOCE counseling posed harms 
that were real, not merely speculative.  Id. at 238.  
Specifically, we pointed to the legislative record, which 
revealed that various reputable scientific and professional 
organizations have publicly condemned the practice of SOCE 
counseling based on its potential to inflict harm and the lack 
of “credible evidence that SOCE counseling is effective.”  Id.   
Finally, in evaluating whether A3371 was more extensive 
than necessary to further the State’s interest, we rejected the 
plaintiff counselors’ argument that requiring “that minor 
clients give their informed consent before undergoing SOCE 
counseling” would serve the State’s objectives just as well.  
Id. at 239-40.  We noted that minors are “especially 
vulnerable” and that they might “feel pressured to receive 
SOCE counseling by their families and their communities.”  
Id. at 240. 
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 As to the plaintiff counselors’ free exercise claim, we 
concluded that “A3371 is neutral and generally applicable, 
and therefore triggers only rational basis review.”  Id. at 242-
43. We rejected the argument that the “individualized 
exemptions” for counseling contained in the statute 
“demonstrate that A3371 covertly targets religiously 
motivated conduct.”  Id. at 242.  Because we had already 
ruled that the statute passed intermediate scrutiny, we 
necessarily concluded that it survived the lower rational basis 
review.  Id. at 243.3   
 
II. 
 
 The instant complaint was filed against the Governor 
of the State of New Jersey on November 1, 2013—several 
months before our ruling in King.  John Doe, a minor, and his 
parents, Jack and Jane Doe, (collectively “Appellants” or “the 
Does”), who are represented by the same attorneys who 
represented the plaintiff counselors in King, alleged in their 
complaint that A3371 violated their First Amendment right to 
receive information, their First Amendment right to the free 
exercise of religion, and their fundamental parental rights.  In 
conjunction with the complaint, Appellants also filed a 
motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to prevent the 
enforcement of A3371 during the pendency of the suit.   
 
                                              
 3 The complaint also alleged other constitutional 
claims on behalf of the counselors’ minor clients, but we held 
that the plaintiff counselors lacked standing to assert such 
claims.  King, 767 F.3d at 244. 
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 At the time the complaint was filed, John Doe was a 
fifteen-year-old boy who claimed that he has struggled with 
“unwanted same-sex attractions” and with “confusion about 
[his] gender identity.”  App. at 221.  These struggles caused 
suicidal thoughts, self-hatred, anxiety, and panic attacks.  He 
and his parents aver that they all have “sincerely-held 
religious beliefs” that homosexuality is wrong and sinful.  
App. at 222, 237.  John Doe began SOCE counseling in May 
of 2011, which he believes has helped him in that he has 
stopped trying to be feminine, has reduced his same-sex 
attractions, has an improved relationship with his father, and 
has rid himself of his feelings of hopelessness or thoughts of 
suicide.  John Doe and his parents wish to continue his SOCE 
counseling.   
 
 On December 6, 2013, Appellees—the Governor of 
the State of New Jersey and Garden State Equity, who 
intervened under the permissive intervention rules—opposed 
the preliminary injunction and moved to dismiss the 
complaint.  The District Court administratively terminated the 
motion for the preliminary injunction on March 28, 2014, and 
on July 31, 2014, a few months prior to our decision in King, 
the District Court issued a decision and order dismissing 
Appellants’ complaint.  See Doe v. Christie, 33 F. Supp. 3d 
518 (D.N.J. 2014).   
 
 The District Court ruled that Appellants’ First 
Amendment speech claims fail because SOCE counseling is 
conduct not speech and A3371 easily surpassed rational basis 
review.  Id. at 524-27.4  As to Appellants’ free exercise 
                                              
 4 The District Court had ruled similarly in King, and 
we rejected the conclusion that SOCE counseling was 
12 
 
claims, the Court, explaining that the analysis was the same 
whether the challenger was the client or the counselor, 
dismissed the Does’ free exercise claim because A3371 was 
neutral and generally applicable.  Id. at 527-28.  Finally, the 
District Court also dismissed Appellants’ claims that were 
premised on their fundamental parental rights.  The Court 
explained that the constitutional right of parents to direct the 
upbringing of their children is “not without qualification.”  Id. 
at 528.  The Court concluded that the case-law did not 
support Appellants’ “argument that parents have an 
unqualified right to select medical procedures, e.g., mental 
health treatment practices, for their children.”  Id. at 530.  
Appellants filed a timely appeal. 
 
III. 
 
 For the reasons stated in our recent decision in King, 
we will affirm the dismissal of the free exercise and right to 
receive information claims.  Appellants here raise the same 
challenges to A3371 as were raised by the plaintiff counselors 
in King, and after extensively considering these arguments, 
we upheld the constitutionality of A3371.  See 767 F.3d at 
224-40. 
 
 The only “new” argument raised by Appellants with 
respect to these claims is that A3371 burdens, not their right 
to speak, but their right to receive information.  Specifically, 
                                                                                                     
conduct, not speech.  Nonetheless, we ultimately affirmed the 
District Court’s dismissal of the free speech claim, albeit for 
other reasons—namely, that A3371 survived intermediate 
scrutiny that we apply to professional speech restrictions.  See 
King, 767 F.3d at 224-40. 
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they argue that “[t]he First Amendment protects the right to 
receive information as a corollary of the right to speak” and 
that “A3371 prevents . . . minors . . . from receiving the 
viewpoint of SOCE counseling from a licensed professional, 
which may be beneficial to those who seek to reduce or 
eliminate their unwanted [same-sex attractions].”  Appellants’ 
Br. at 14-15.5  
 
  Appellants are correct that the First Amendment 
protects both the speaker and the recipient of information.  
See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976).  However, the 
cases interpreting the First Amendment do not contemplate 
that some speech may be restricted as to the speaker but not 
to the listener.  The listener’s right to receive information is 
reciprocal to the speaker’s right to speak.  See id.; Bd. of 
Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 
U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“[T]he right to receive ideas follows 
ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send 
them.”).  As we concluded in King, A3371 does not violate 
the counselors’ right to speak, see 767 F.3d at 240, and, as a 
                                              
 5 We stated in King that A3371 did not prevent the 
plaintiff counselors from expressing the viewpoint that same-
sex attractions are capable of being reduced or eliminated “in 
the form of their personal opinion, to anyone they please, 
including their minor clients.  What A3371 prevents Plaintiffs 
from doing is expressing this viewpoint in a very specific 
way—by actually rendering the professional services.”  767 
F.3d at 237.  Likewise, our ruling here today will not prevent 
Appellants from obtaining information about SOCE despite 
their inability to receive SOCE counseling from licensed 
counselors in New Jersey. 
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result, it does not violate Appellants’ right to receive 
information.   
 
 Appellants argue that if we were to conclude that their 
rights to receive information are not violated by A3371, we 
would be “turn[ing] the First Amendment analysis on its 
head” because it would mean “that Appellants have no right 
to receive information which the State has banned.”  
Appellants’ Reply Br. at 12.  But this argument is 
fundamentally flawed.  We are not suggesting that Appellants 
do not have the right to receive the information for the reason 
that the legislature enacted A3371, which bars the provision 
of SOCE counseling to minors; rather, Appellants’ right to 
receive the information is not violated because we already 
upheld A3371, which bans the provision of SOCE counseling 
to minors, against a constitutional challenge in King. 
 
IV. 
 There is one additional claim raised in this case that 
was not at issue in King.  Here, Appellants claim that A3371 
violates their fundamental right to direct the upbringing of 
their child.  There is no dispute that “the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right 
of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, 
and control of their children.”  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 
57, 66 (2000).  But this right is not without limits, and the 
State may “[a]ct[] to guard the general interest in [a] youth’s 
well being.”  See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944).  “[A] state is not without constitutional control over 
parental discretion in dealing with children when their 
physical or mental health is jeopardized.”  Parham v. J.R., 
442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).  While the case law supports 
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Appellants’ argument that parents have decision-making 
authority with regard to the provision of medical care for their 
children, see e.g., id., the case law does not support the 
extension of this right to a right of parents to demand that the 
State make available a particular form of treatment.   
 
 We agree with the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in 
Pickup v. Brown, a case addressing a challenge to California’s 
similar statute prohibiting SOCE counseling to minors.  In 
Pickup, the Ninth Circuit referred to decisions holding that 
patients do not have the right to choose specific treatments for 
themselves and stated, “it would be odd if parents had a 
substantive due process right to choose specific treatments for 
their children—treatments that reasonably have been deemed 
harmful by the state—but not for themselves.”  740 F.3d at 
1235-36.  The court concluded, “the fundamental rights of 
parents do not include the right to choose a specific type of 
provider for a specific medical or mental health treatment that 
the state has reasonably deemed harmful.”  Id. at 1236.  We 
agree with this reasoning, and therefore, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of Appellants’ parental rights 
claims. 
 
V. 
 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the July 31, 2014 
decision and order of the District Court dismissing 
Appellants’ complaint in its entirety.  
